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Abstract 
In previous work (Nescolarde-Selva and Usó-Doménech, 2014a,b) discussed the theory that complex 
belief systems have a topological structure. In this paper it is suggested that this structure is also fuzzy. 
They introduce the concepts of fuzzy sets in the context of beliefs (substantive and derived) , and between 
derived beliefs themselves. Also introduced are the concepts of fuzzy covering, fuzzy invariance and the 
relationships between them. 
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1. INTRODUCTION: PREVIOUS CONCEPTS 
 
Complex societies are concerned with possibility and necessity, their Superstructure can 
been divided in two as follows (Nescolarde-Selva and Usó-Doménech, 2013a,b, 2014a,b; 
Usó-Domènech and Nescolarde-Selva, 2012):  
 
1) The Doxical Superstructure (DS) is formed by values in fact, political and 
religious ideologies and culture of a human society in a certain historical time.   
2) The Mythical Superstructure(MS) also has been divided into two parts:  
a) MS1 containing the mythical components or primigenial bases of the 
ideologies and cultures with the ideal values. 
b)  MS2 containing ideal values and utopias that are the wished and 
unattainable goals of belief systems of the Doxical Superstructure (DS).   
 
These ideas are summarized in the following diagram (Figure 1): 
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Figure 
1: Structural base and superstructures. 
 
According to Nescolarde-Selva and Usó-Doménech (2013a,b) a belief system is a set of 
related ideas, learned and shared which has some permanence in time and space, and to 
which individuals and/or groups exhibit some commitment (Borhek and Curtis, 1983; 
Eliade, 1978)). The conditions of permanence, commitment, and connectedness are 
variable characteristics through which we expect belief systems to be related to social 
organization. 
Any belief system will be formed by two essential levels: 
 
1. Ideal or abstract level. 
2. Material level or text. 
 
The first of the levels or the abstract level of the S it is the focus of this work. It is 
embedded in the individual mind and has been acquired by means of physical 
transaction, either oral or visual, through a textual materialization, such as a written, 
pictorial, architectural, musical, and so forth, text. We may in fact affirm that a belief 
system operates as a cybernetic feedback process (Figure 2). 
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Figure 2: Cybernetic feedback process. 
 
Definition 1: The abstract belief level) is formed by a set of elements nominated 
substantive beliefs Σ forming the unquestionable truths of the system (axioms) and a set 
of derived beliefs Δ, formed from substantive beliefs. 
 
Substantive beliefs constitute the axioms of the system, while many of the derived 
beliefs will constitute their theorems. 
Considering this argument we propose following initial hypotheses: 
 
Hypothesis 1: Beliefs are not products of reason nor of abstract and logical thought. 
 
Hypothesis 2: In the origin of any belief system there is always a supernatural system 
of beliefs. 
 
Hypothesis 3: Derived beliefs become substantial beliefs with the passage of time, 
giving origin to a more or less ample body of substantive beliefs, that is to say, a 
religion. 
 
Hypothesis 4: When belonging to the Ideological Doxical Superstructure (Nescolarde-
Selva and Usó-Doménech.(2014a,b) Usó-Doménech and Nescolarde-Selva, (2012), the 
set S of substantive beliefs will be ‘‘ideal’’, that is to say, merely abstract. 
 
Let  be the set of substantive beliefs and  the set of 
derived beliefs, such that  (Nescolarde-Selva and 
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Usó-Doménech, 2013). There is the “no belief” or empty belief, which we will 
represent by∅ . Set BS forms a belief sequence because it is an ordered list of objects. It 
contains terms or beliefs, and the number of terms is called the length of the sequence. 
Order matters, and the exact same terms can appear multiple times at different positions 
in the belief sequence. BS forms a finite sequence with terms in the set BS because it is 
a function from { }mn dddsss ,...,,,,...,, 2121  to BS.  
 
Hypothesis 5: We consider the subset of substantive beliefs Σ as fixed, i.e., with a 
constant cardinal, and the subset of derived beliefs D possessing a varying cardinal. 
 
We shall say that a set of variables {x1, …, xn} forms a chain of relations if there is a set 
of relations{r1, …, rn-1}∈R such that {x1r1x2, x2r2x3, …, xn-1rn-1xn}. The belief system 
thus conceived, will present a chain structure (Figure 3). 
s1 s s s4.................2 3
d1(1) d d d2(2)d2(3)...d3(1)   d3(2) ..........d4(1)   d4(2)  d4(3)  FIRST LEVEL1 11(2)
1 1
2(1)
1 1 1 1 1 1 1
........... ..
SECOND LEVEL
THIRD LEVEL
. 
. 
.
n-LEVEL
 
Figure 3: Chain structure of belief systems. 
 
Therefore it will constitute an alysidal set as defined by Nescolarde-Selva, Vives Maciá, 
Usó-Doménech and Berend, (2012a,b) and Nescolarde-Selva and Usó-Doménech (2012) 
 
Definition 1: A belief system is an alysidal belief set (S,R) whose elements are chains 
formed by beliefs united by freeways of relations of logical derivation.   
 
Note 1: The sheaf is a single relation (monorelational sheaf).  
 
Note 2: It is a clockwise sheaf (sheaf of direct relations) denoted d-hij because relations 
forming the sheaf go from element xi to element xj.  
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Due to the complexity of the proposed problem, we have taken a decision to simplify 
the chains, assuming that each substantive belief s, produces a single chain of derived 
beliefs (Figure 4). 
 
s1 s s s4.................2 3
d1 d d3  ..........         d4     FIRST LEVEL1 2
1 1 1
........... ..
SECOND LEVEL
THIRD LEVEL
. 
. 
.
n-LEVEL
 Figure 4: Simplified structure of chain of belief systems. 
 
 
2. FUZZY DERIVED RELATIONS 
 
A fuzzy relation is characterized by the same two items in a fuzzy set:  
 
1) It is a list containing element and membership grade pairs, {{ , }, }, {{ , 
}, }, ... , {{ , }, }}. Note that the elements of the relation are defined as 
ordered pairs, { , }, { , }, ... , { , }. These elements are again grouped with 
their membership grades, { , , ... , }, which are values that range from 0 to 1, 
inclusive. 
 
2) The second item characterizing fuzzy relations is the universal space. For relations, 
the universal space consists of a pair of ordered pairs, {{ , , }, { , , }}. 
The first pair defines the universal space to be used for the first set under consideration 
in the relation, and the second pair defines the universal space for the second set. 
 
Assuming that V and W are two collections of objects, an arbitrary fuzzy set B, defined 
as the Cartesian product VxW, will be called a fuzzy relation in the space VxW. R is 
thus a function defined in the space VxW, which takes values from the interval [0, 1]. 
R : V x W  [0, 1]. In the case where V = W, we have a binary fuzzy relation on a 
single set V. We can start our discussion by considering a countable collection of 
objects V = { }, i = 1, 2, ... Then W = { }, j = 1, 2, ... 
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A fuzzy relation R can be represented in the following way: R = {{{ , }, R( , )}}, 
i = 1, 2, ... ; j = 1, 2, ... 
According to Lloret-Climent, Nescolarde-Selva and Pérez-Gonzaga (2014), the direct 
and indirect influences between beliefs will provide the basis for obtaining fuzzy and/or 
non-fuzzy relationships, so that the concepts of coverage and invariability between sets 
of beliefs will appear naturally, these concepts and their interconnections will be 
analyzed from the viewpoint of algebraic properties of inclusion, union and intersection, 
as well as with the loop concept, which as we shall see, will be especially important. In 
our work, we use some important concepts of the fuzzy system, including membership 
function, inclusion, intersection, union, support and fuzzy relation. 
When any two beliefs are related, we know that one of them exercises, directly, a 
certain influence on the other. Taking this into account, we obtain the following 
definitions and results, bearing in mind the fact that the relations will always be fuzzy 
from now on since we can always consider a classic relation as a particular case of a 
fuzzy one.  
Let B = (S,R) be a belief system. Let si (i = 1, 2,….n) be the substantive beliefs and 
k
id the derived beliefs. The subscript i = 1,2,…,n corresponds to the substantive belief 
which derives and the superscript k = 1,2,...,m indicates the level of derived belief. 
 
Definition 2:  If two beliefs Sds ii ∈
1, and Sdd ki
k
i ∈
+1, verify 
that ( ) ( ) 0,0,7 11 >=>=∈∃ + pddorpdsRr kikiriiri µµ  for any fuzzy relation, we say 
that si directly influences 1id  or 
k
jd  directly influences 
1+k
jd with grade p through the 
fuzzy relation r. 
 
From now on, we need to bear in mind the fact that the chains of relations that will exist 
between any two beliefs of S may contain classic or fuzzy relations of the types 
mentioned here in indiscriminate fashion, as well as containing elements that could 
belong to fuzzy belief sets or not. Clearly, all the degrees of influence we are going to 
consider will strictly be greater than zero. If not, we would have superfluous influences, 
so we eliminate them and simplify the chain of relations. 
 
Definition 3: A belief Ssi ∈ indirectly influences the element Sd
k
i ∈ with grade p, if 
there is a chain, starting with s1 and ending with kid , that contains relations of R and 
elements of S, and verifying that the minimum degree of indirect influence obtained with 
this chain is equal to p.  
 
Definition 4: The structure of the belief system is hierarchical because no subset of S is 
a loop.  
 
Definition 5: The structure of relations for each derived belief is: 
( ) ( ){ } ( ){ }0,,/)(0,,/ 11111 >∈∃∈=∧>∈∃∈= ++ kikirkikikiSiiriiiS ddRrSddfdsRrSdsf µµ
 
Definition 6: The structure of relations for the derived belief Sdi ∈
1  associated with 
the fuzzy relation Rr ki ∈  is ( ) ( ){ }0,/, 11 >∈= ++ kikirkikikiS ddSdrdf µ . 
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Definition 7: The structure of relations for any belief set B⊆S  is 
( )

Bd
Bs
k
iSiSS
k
i
i
dfsfBf
∈
∈
= )()( . 
 
Definition 8: The structure of relations for any set B⊆S and associated with the fuzzy 
relation Rr ki ∈  is ( )
Bd
Bs
k
i
k
iSiiS
k
iS
k
i
i
rdfrsfrBf
∈
∈
= ,),(),( 1 . 
 
From the above we can deduce the following result: 
 
       Theorem 1: For each B⊆S is verified that 

Rr
k
iSS
k
i
rBfBf
∈
= ),()( . 
 
Proof.   
 
( ) ( )
   
Rr Rr
Bd
Bs Br
S
k
iSiS
k
i
k
iSiiS
k
iS
k
i
k
i k
i
i
k
i
BfdfsfrdfrsfrBf
∈ ∈
∈
∈ ∈
=== )()(),),((),( 1 . 
 
3. FUZZY DERIVED BELIEFS’ SETS 
  
Fuzzy set theory shows the intention to generalize the classical notion of a set and a 
proposition to accommodate fuzziness in the sense that it is contained in human 
language, that is, in human beliefs, judgments, evaluations, and decisions. Zadeh writes 
(1965): “The notion of a fuzzy set provides a convenient point of departure for the 
construction of a conceptual framework which parallels in many respects the 
framework used in the case of ordinary sets, but it is more general than the latter and, 
potentially, may prove to have a much wider scope of applicability, particularly in the 
ﬁelds of pattern classiﬁcation and information processing. Essentially, such a 
framework provides a natural way of dealing with problems in which the source of 
imprecision is the absence of sharply deﬁned criteria of class membership rather than 
the presence of random variables”. 
Most of us are familiar with Classical logic. Classical logic is bivalued. That is, 
propositions are seen as either True or False. So, when we reason about propositions 
like "Sarah is a woman." We can evaluate that proposition as either True or False. But 
fuzzy logic is many-valued. Many-valued logic (Béziau, 1997; Cignoli et al, 2000; 
Malinowski, 2001; Miller and Thornton, 2008; Usó-Doménech, Nescolarde-Selva and 
Pérez-Gonzaga, 2014) differs from classical logic from the fundamental fact that it 
allows for partial truth. In classical logic, truth takes on values in the set {0, 1}, in other 
words, only the value 1 or 0, meaning “Yes, it's true,” or “No, it's not,” respectively. It is 
a t-norm based system. Many-valued logics as their natural extension which take on 
values in the interval [0, 1]. Per definition, t-norm based systems are many-valued if the 
set of valuations is not countable and this set is the interval [ ]1,0 . That is, set-
membership can vary along a continuum. "Truthfulness" can vary along a continuum 
from 100% True to 50% True to 0% True (and all values in between). This may seem 
strange, but examples are close at hand. For example, evaluate the following 
propositions. Are they true or false? "Dani is a good person." "This conversation is 
gossip." "Isaac is a Jewish." "That view is heresy." "Sarah believes in God." Are 
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propositions like these, moral and ideological propositions, best evaluated by classical, 
bivalued logic? Can we cleanly say that a given proposition is true or false? The reason 
is that sets such as "goodness," "gossip," “Jewish," "heresy," and "belief" are best 
viewed as fuzzy sets. Fuzzy sets don't have discrete boundaries. Thus, set-membership 
is not a discrete In versus Out. Extreme cases might be easily classified, but generally 
we would evaluate set-membership as varying along a continuum.  
 
Example 1: "Teacher, which is the greatest commandment in the Law?" Jesus replied: 
"'Love the Lord your God with all your heart and with all your soul and with all your 
mind.' This is the first and greatest commandment. And the second is like it: 'Love your 
neighbor as yourself.' All the Law and the Prophets hang on these two 
commandments." (Matthew 22: 36-40) 
 
Lots of doctrinal and ethical propositions are true. But we like the example above 
because they hint that doctrinal and ethical categories are fuzzy. That is, there are 
"greatest" commandments and things of "first" importance. Too often, in doctrinal and 
ethical discussions we get tangled in, people tend to reason and debate in bivalued 
categories. Of course, if a proposition is in the Bible it can lay a claim to truth. But these 
passages, and the example we offered above, suggest that debates and conversations 
may be better served if people employ fuzzy categories. Allowing some issues to be, we 
have no better words for this, "more true" or "more ethical." 
Dominance of bivalued logic is why the public discourse involving ideology is so 
impoverished. Bivalued logic is neat, clean, and easy to use. Everything is cut and dried. 
There is good and there is evil. And whose side are you on? There is right and there is 
wrong. Which will you choose? Etc. 
The ability to rationally change one's beliefs in the face of new information which, 
possibly, contradicts the currently held beliefs is a basic characteristic of intelligent 
behavior. A very successful framework in which this question is studied is the one due 
to Alchourrón, Gärdenfors and Makinson (1985) and Gärdenfors (1988), with its 
operation of partial meet revision. One limitation of this framework is that belief in a 
formula is taken as a matter of all or nothing: either the formula is believed or it is not. 
One limitation of this framework is that belief in a formula is taken as a matter of all or 
nothing: either the formula is believed or it is not. However, real-life knowledge bases 
may well contain information of a more graded nature. For instance we might want to 
represent information about vague concepts or uncertain beliefs. Likewise revision 
inputs may come with a degree of certainty attached. 
 
Deﬁnition 9: If S is a collection of derived beliefs denoted generically by kid , then a 
fuzzy belief set A  in S is a set of ordered pairs: ( )( ){ }SdddA kikiAki ∈= µ,  
  
( )kiA dµ is called the membership function (generalized characteristic function) which 
maps S to the membership space M. Its range is the subset of non-negative real numbers 
whose supremum is ﬁnite. For ( ) 1sup =kiA dµ : normalized fuzzy set. 
In this definition, the membership function of the fuzzy set is a real-valued function. A 
type m fuzzy belief set whose memberships value are type m-1, m>1, fuzzy belief sets 
on [0, 1]. 
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4. FUZZY COVERAGE 
 
One of the first properties to appear when studying systemic approachs of complex 
systems is coverage (Esteve and Lloret, 2006a,b). This property is fundamental when 
studying the direct relations existing between all the subsets of S.  
 
 
Definition 10: Let A,B ⊆ S be two sets of beliefs. We say that A covers B if fS (A)=B. In 
other words, if each belief element of B is directly influenced by any belief element of A. 
 
For the case where the sets A and B are fuzzy ( )BA, , the above definition becomes fS 
( )( ) ( )BpAp supsup = , as for any belief Ads kii ∈, whose membership function is 0, we 
obtain ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )( )kjBkjBiAkjir ddsds µµµµ ,0min,min, =≤  
or ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )( )ljBljBkiAljkir ddddd µµµµ ,0min,min, =≤ , so that ( ) 0, =kjir dsµ , and si will 
not be effectively related to any other belief or ( ) 0, =ljkir ddµ  and kid  will not be 
effectively related to any other belief. 
However, if set A  is fuzzy and B is non-fuzzy, the definition of coverage becomes: 
( )( ) .sup BApf S =  
 
Superscripts k, l can be lk = or .lk ≠  
 
Theorem 2: Let CBA ,,  be the fuzzy beliefs sets such as SCBA ⊆,, . If A  covers B  
and B  covers C , then each element of ( )Cpsup  is indirectly influenced by an element 
of ( )Apsup . 
 
Proof.  
Let ( )Cpd mh sup∈ . As B  covers C , we obtain ( ) RrBpd lj ∈∃∧∈∃ sup , so 
that ( ) 0, >mhljr ddµ . Similarly, as ( )Bpd lj sup∈  and A  covers B , we 
obtain ( ) RrApd ki ∈∃∧∈∃ sup , so that ( ) 0, >ljkir ddµ  .As ( ) ( )mhljrljkir dddd ,0, µµ ∧> , 
we therefore deduce that kid  exercises an indirect influence on 
m
hd . 
Reasoning in the same way about each element of ( )Cpsup  demonstrates the theorem. 
 
Note 1: The result we have just proven is also valid for combinations of the three belief 
sets A, B and C that are not necessarily fuzzy beliefs sets, for example taking A  and 
C as fuzzy belief sets and B as a non-fuzzy belief set. 
 
Using the property of coverage, the possible existence of loops is determined in the 
following result: 
 
Theorem 3: Let SBA ⊆,  be the belief fuzzy sets, where )(sup Ap  is a finite set, so 
that ( )BpAp sup)(sup ⊆ . Thus, if A  covers B , a loop will be included in )(sup Ap . 
 
Proof.  
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We know that ( ) ( )( )ApfBpAp S supsup)(sup =⊆ , as A  covers B . 
Let ( )( )Apcardn sup= , and let dn+1 be any derived belief of )(sup Ap . Thus, 
))((sup1 Apfd Sn ∈+ , so that )(sup1 Apdn ∈∃ + and Rrn ∈∃ , so that ( ) 0, 1 >+nnr ddµ . In 
addition, as ))((sup Apfd Sn ∈ , )(sup1 Apdn ∈∃ + and  Rdn ∈∃ −1 ∃rn-1∈R, so 
that ( ) 0,1 >− nnr ddµ . 
 
After n iterations, we obtain a chain of relations and, as the cardinal of )(sup Ap  is n, 
we obtain { }jinji <+∈∃ ,1,...,2,1, , , so that ji dd =  and therefore the set 
ji dd ,..., forms a loop contained in )(sup Ap . 
 
Note 2: The above property is also valid if one of the beliefs sets is fuzzy and the other 
is not. 
 
Theorem 4: Let SBA ⊆,  be two fuzzy belief sets, verifying that BA ⊆ . Thus, 
)(sup)(sup BpAp ⊂ .  
 
Proof. 
 
As BA ⊆ , then ( ) ( )kiBkiA dd µµ ≤ Sd ki ∈∀ . In addition, if )(sup Apd ki ∈ , we know 
that ( ) 0>kiA dµ and thus, ( ) ( ) 0>≥ kiAkiB dd µµ , so obtaining )(sup Bpd ki ∈ .   
 
5. FUZZY INVARIABILITY 
 
In previous articles (Esteve and Lloret, 2006a,b) have shown that the abundance of 
invariable subsets of S can guarantee system behavior with little predisposition to 
change, and therefore free of upsets. We will now adapt the definition of the invariable 
belief subset to our fuzzy environment. 
 
Definition 11: Let SA ⊆  be a fuzzy belief set. We say that )(sup Ap is invariable if 
)(sup))((sup ApApf S ⊆ . 
 
Note 3: If A is and ordinary belief set, A is invariable if AAf S ⊆)( . 
 
Theorem 5: Let SA ⊆  be a fuzzy belief set such that )(sup Ap is invariable. Thus, 
))((sup Apf S is also invariable.  
 
Proof  
 
Let ))((sup( Apffd SS
k
i ∈ . Thus ( )liSkiSli dfdApfd ∈∈∃ /)((sup . As )(sup Ap is 
invariable, we obtain )(sup Apd li ∈ , and also ))((sup Apfd S
k
i ∈ , which proves that  
))((sup Apf S is invariable. 
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Note 4: The above theorem can also be extended to )))((sup( Apff SS , and in this way 
indefinitely to )))))...)...((sup(...(...( Apfff SSS  
 
Theorem 6: Let SBA ⊆,  be two fuzzy belief sets, whose supports are both invariable. 
Thus, )(sup)(sup BpAp   for the ordinary union is invariable. 
 
Proof 
 
Let )(sup)(sup BpApd ki ∈ , thus )(sup)(sup BpdApd
k
i
k
i ∈∨∈ . If )(sup Apd
k
i ∈ , 
as )(sup Ap  is invariable, we obtain )(sup))((sup ApApf S ⊆ , and thus 
( ) )(sup)(sup BpApdf kiS ⊆ . For )(sup Bpd ki ∈ , the same reasoning is applied and 
we complete the demonstration. 
 
Theorem 7: The fuzzy and ordinary unions and the support 
satisfy ( )BApBpAp  sup)(sup)(sup = . 
 
Proof 
 
As 
( ) ( )
( ) ( )( ) ).(sup0,max
00)(sup)(sup)(sup)(sup
BApddd
ddBpdApdBpApd
k
i
k
iB
k
iA
k
iB
k
iA
k
i
k
i
k
i


∈⇔>
⇔>∨>⇔∈∨∈⇔∈
µµ
µµ
  
Theorem 8: Let SBA ⊆,  be two fuzzy belief sets both with invariable supports. Thus, 
( )BAp sup  is invariable. 
 
Proof  
 
It is deduced from the two previous theorems. 
 
The same result is obtained with the intersection of two invariable sets and we will now 
show this. 
 
Theorem 9: Let SBA ⊆,  be two fuzzy belief sets both with invariable supports. Thus, 
if ∅≠)(sup)(sup BpAp  , we see that )(sup)(sup BpAp  is invariable for the 
ordinary intersection. 
 
Proof  
 
Let )(sup)(sup BpApd ki ∈ . As )(sup Apd
k
i ∈  and )(sup Ap is invariable, 
( ) )(sup Apdf kiS ⊆ . In the same way, with )(sup Bpd ki ∈  we obtain 
( ) )(sup Bpdf kiS ⊆ . 
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Thus ( ) )(sup)(sup BpApdf kiS ⊆ , 
giving )(sup)(sup))(sup)((sup BpApBpApf S  ⊆ , and thus )(sup)(sup BpAp   
will be invariable. 
 
Theorem 10: The ordinary and fuzzy intersections and the support satisfy 
( )BApBpAp  sup)(sup)(sup = . 
 
Proof 
 
As 
( ) ( )
( ) ( )( ) ).(sup0,min
00)(sup)(sup)(sup)(sup
BApddd
ddBpdApdBpApd
k
i
k
iB
k
iA
k
iB
k
iA
k
i
k
i
k
i


∈⇔>
⇔>∧>⇔∈∧∈⇔∈
µµ
µµ
 
 
Theorem 11: Let SBA ⊆,  be two fuzzy belief sets, whose supports are both 
invariable. Thus, if ∅≠)(sup)(sup BpAp  , )(sup BAp  is invariable. 
 
Proof 
 
It is deduced from the last two theorems. 
 
6. RELATIONS BETWEEN FUZZY COVERAGE AND FUZZY 
INVARIABILITY IN FUZZY DERIVED BELIEF SETS 
 
We now present a series of results, from different points of view, which prove the 
relation existing between the concepts of coverage and invariability in fuzzy derived 
belief sets. 
Let (S, R) be a belief system and let SBA ⊆,  be two fuzzy belief sets both with 
invariable supports 
 
Theorem 12: If A  covers B , )(sup)(sup BpAp   will be invariable. 
 
Proof  
 
Let )(sup)(sup BpApd ki ∈ , thus )(sup)(sup BpdApd
k
i
k
i ∈∨∈ . If )(sup Apd
k
i ∈ , 
as A  covers B , then ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )BpApApdf kiS supsupsup ⊆⊆ . In addition, if 
)(sup Bpd ki ∈ , as this is an invariable set, we get 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )BpApBpdf kiS supsupsup ⊆⊆ . All this proves that )(sup)(sup BpAp   is 
invariable. 
 
Corollary 1: Under the same conditions as the previous Theorem, we have 
)(sup)(sup BpAp  covering )(sup Bp . 
 
Proof  
 
Trivial, applying properties.  
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Let SBA ⊆,  be two fuzzy belief sets so that A  covers B . 
 
Theorem 13: )(ASupp  will be invariable )(sup)(sup ApBp ⊆⇔ .           
 
Proof 
 
 (⇒ ) Let )(ASuppd ki ∈ . As A  covers B we obtain )(ASuppd
l
i ∈∃ , so that 
( )liSki dfd ∈ . In addition, as )(sup Ap  is invariable, ( ) ( )Apdfd liSki sup⊆∈ . In other 
words, )(sup)(sup ApBp ⊆⇔ .  
 
(⇐ )Let )(ASuppd ki ∈ . As A  covers B we obtain ( ) ( ) ( )ApBpdf kiS supsup ⊆⊆ . Thus, 
( ) ( ) ( ))sup)sup(sup ApApBpf S ∧⊆  will be invariable. 
 
Let SA ⊆ be the fuzzy belief set, so that A  covers itself. 
 
Corollary 2: )(ASupp is invariable. 
 
Proof  
 
Trivial, replacing A  with A  in the previous theorem.  
 
Let SBA ⊆,  be two fuzzy belief sets so that A covers B  and B  covers A  
 
Theorem 14: )(sup)( BpASupp  is invariable. 
 
Proof  
 
Let )(sup)(sup BpApd ki ∈ , thus )(sup)(sup BpdApd
k
i
k
i ∈∨∈ . If ( )Apd ki sup∈ , 
we obtain ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )BpApBpdf kiS supsupsup ⊆⊆ . In addition, if ( )Bpd ki sup∈ , we 
obtain ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )BpApApdf kiS supsupsup ⊆⊆ . 
Thus, )(sup)(sup BpApd ki ∈∀ verifies that ( ) )(sup)(sup BpApdf kiS ⊆ , giving 
( ) )(sup)(sup)(sup)(sup BpApBpApf S  ⊆ , and therefore )(sup)(sup BpAp   
will be invariable. 
 
We obtain a similar but more enlarged result with the following corollary. 
 
Corollary 3: Let SAAAA no ⊆,...,,, 21  be the fuzzy belief sets, so that no AA =  and iA  
cover 1,...,1,0,1 −=∀+ niAi . Thus, )(sup...)(sup)(sup 110 −nApApAp   is 
invariable. 
 
Proof  
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Trivial, applying the known properties and using the same reasoning as in the previous 
Theorem.  
 
Theorem 15:  Let SLA ⊆,  be fuzzy belief sets, so that )(sup Ap  is invariable 
and )(sup Lp  is a loop. Thus, it can only be that )(sup)(sup ApLp ⊆  or that )(sup Ap  
and )(sup Lp are disjointed. 
 
Proof  
 
Let )(sup Lpd ki ∈ . We can find that )(sup)(sup ApdApd
k
i
k
i ∉∨∈ . Firstly, suppose 
that )(sup Apd ki ∈ . As )(sup Ap  is invariable, we will have ( ) )(sup Apdf kiS ⊆ . In 
other words, the derived belief following kid  in the loop will also belong to )(sup Ap . 
Using the same reasoning, the following derived belief will also belong to )(sup Ap and 
successively until we reach our derived belief kid . All derived beliefs in the loop 
therefore belong to )(sup Ap and we obtain that )(sup)(sup ApLp ⊆ . 
Now suppose that )(sup Apd ki ∉ . In this case, if the derived belief following 
k
id  in the 
loop is an derived belief of )(sup Ap , then the successive derived belief in the loop 
(note that as it is a loop, we are talking about all its derived beliefs) will also belong to 
)(sup Ap and, as )(sup Ap is invariable, our derived belief kid  will also do so, thus 
contradicting our initial supposition. 
So, if )(sup Lpd ki ∈ , we have )(sup Apd
k
i ∉ , in other words, both belief sets will be 
disjointed.  
 
7. REFLECTIONS  
 
1) Ideology is a fuzzy set of attitudes, beliefs, behavioral conventions, and basic 
assumptions and values that are shared by a group of people, and that influence each 
member's behavior and each member's interpretations of the 'meaning' of other people's 
behavior (Usó-Doménech.and Nescolarde-Selva, 2012; van Dijk, 2000). What a theory 
of ideology needs to explain, then, is precisely the dynamics that relate social members 
to ideologies and to the collectivities that are constituted by shared experiences, beliefs 
and ideologies. We need to know how individual membership, identification, 
allegiance, solidarity and active participation are being defined in relation to such a 
collectivity and its organization. It should be examined how groups may grow and 
decay as a result of the actions and participation of individuals. That ideological groups 
may be quite loose or fuzzy in their definition, and their membership or adherence 
flexibly defined in terms of the interplay between personal beliefs and socially shared 
beliefs, does not mean that we can dispense with the social dimension of ideologies in 
terms of groups. It is this interface between the individual and the group that is one of 
the theorical problems that need to be examined in a theory of ideologies. 
Instead of defining belief systems and ideologies as the basis of all social cognition, we 
will now assume that general, cultural knowledge is the basis of all group-specific 
beliefs, including ideologies. Such cultural knowledge, or cultural common-ground, 
may be defined as the fuzzy set of those beliefs that are shared by (virtually) all 
competent members of a culture, and that are held to be true by those members by 
similarly shared criteria of truth. Neither cultural nor group knowledge is a well-defined 
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concept. They are essentially fuzzy, in the sense that there is no effective procedure to 
establish for each culture or group what beliefs they collectively share (or indeed which 
are only shared by part of the group). Yet, the notions are far from arbitrary, and a quite 
reliable test (and there are others) is a presupposition in discourse. Cultural knowledge 
may be presupposed in all types of discourse by all competent (adult, sane, etc.) 
members, except of course in all didactic and pedagogical discourse that serves to teach 
such knowledge. Indeed, many groups may have ideological “deviants” or '”dissidents”. 
If this is the case, the notion of group may at least sornetirnes be distinct from the set of 
its individual members. Maybe “groupness” only requires that most or many of the 
members share some property. However, such fuzzy criteria also make groups rather 
like fuzzy sets rather than strict sets of members.  
One trivial answer already formulated is simply quantitative. That is, an ideological  
group can be defined as such if most of its members share most of the propositions that 
define the ideology, where the fuzzy quantifier “most” may be assigned any value 
between, say, seventy-five per cent and 100 per cent. Somewhat less trivial would be to 
replace the quantifier for the number of propositions by the set of substantive beliefs or 
“core” ideological propositions, namely, those that are the specific, defining or 
prototypical fundamental beliefs of a group. This is relatively straightforward of course 
for groups defined primarily by their ideologies.  
 
2) In previous work (Nescolarde-Selva and Usó-Doménech, 2014a,b) developed the 
theory that belief systems have a topological structure. Nevertheless, from where do 
these mathematical structures come? In the case of structures of visual materialization 
the answer seems clear. However, it is not so in the world of beliefs and ideas. Unless 
we accept the philosophy of Plato, freeing the world of ideas from the human being, 
beliefs, both substantive and derived beliefs have a material origin, inserted in the 
human brain. This can be considered from two aspects:  psychological and linguistic: 
 
1) Associated with the topological points is a family of open sets that cover space, 
like the response fields that constitute neighbourhoods of the actual neurons in 
the brain. The key point is that there are certain invariants associated with a 
topology that remain unchanged under the transformations.  In the case of the 
visual field, the transformations are the distortions imposed by viewing 
conditions.  The objects in the visual field are recognized as what they are in 
their own right no matter how their appearance may be distorted by viewing 
conditions:  near or far, right-left, up-or-down in the field of view, rotated, 
moving, or viewed obliquely or binocularly.  In addition, a tune is still 
recognizable even if it is shifted in key or changed in loudness, or heard 
binaurally. This invariance constitutes the psychological constancies.  Lacking 
constancy invariance, you would always be moving through a surrealistic world 
of perpetually deforming, rubbery objects.  For the visual system, it is axiomatic 
that an object is determined by its bounding contours, and it is the invariance of 
these under different viewing conditions that determines constancy and form 
memory (Lewin, 1936). This brings us to the blessed domain of Lie 
transformation groups, denoted symbolically by the mapping GTXG → , where 
G is a mathematical group and T is a manifold (Text). G is also continuous and 
is a manifold just like space-time. Now think of a visual contour as a path-curve 
generated by the transformation group action, and choose some point on it.  Call 
this the identity element of the group.  Draw a tiny tangent line to the curve at 
that point.  This is the infinitesimal transformation of the continuous or Lie 
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group. The infinitesimal transformation is embodied in a Lie derivative, which 
"drags the flow along the path-curve", the so-called "orbit"--in this case the 
visual contour of T.  If £ denotes the Lie derivative and f, the visual contour, 
then invariance of the contour under the transformation group is shown by its 
being annulled by the action of the Lie derivative:  £ f = 0, or by its being 
handed on as a "contact element" for further processing: £ f = g(f) .  These 
operations characterize psychological constancy.   
 
2) In addition, neurological processes are organized and sequenced through 
language; hence, language reflects the way each person perceives the world. 
Being a psycho-biological process, one could say that mental maps are a sort of 
biological path along which words travel. The mental representations of 
individuals depend on their experiences, culture, ideology and physiology, 
among other things. Language refers to the way individuals make use of verbal 
expression to communicate experience, and this is done with the structure 
implicit in their own language. 
 
Each of the substantive beliefs are propositions and these are formed by concepts. A 
concept is an analytical definition, an abstraction formed in the mind of a subject 
belonging to a particular semiotic system S.   The different schools of philosophy have 
different contradictory views on the epistemological meaning of the concept. Here, the 
concept is the main component of rational thought in the attempt to apprehend reality. 
The concept is the union of denotative and connotative significances (Usó-Doménech 
and, 2012; Nescolarde-Selva and Usó-Doménech, 2014a,b). And the connotative 
significance of a concept is different according to the World vision of any particular 
belief system. And not only that, but within a World vision, each individual may have a 
different connotation of the concept itself. 
In this paper it is suggested by the authors that this structure is also fuzzy. The idea of 
building a fuzzy topology (Liu, and Luo, 1997) of belief systems and ideologies can be 
an exciting task. 
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